
NATIONAL UNTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA



The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 16 October 1952.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

009627/1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79R01012A001300010004-1

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YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA

THE PROBLEM

To review the conclusions of NIE-42* with respect to Yugoslav intentions.

ESTIMATE

- 1. The conclusions of NIE-42 pertinent to the present problem are as follows:
- a. Resistance activity within Albania, while a troublesome problem for the Hoxha regime, was not an immediate threat.
- b. So long as the resistance effort in Albania remained divided and did not receive substantial external aid, the Albanian security forces could probably control it.
- c. Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece had conflicting interests in Albania, and each probably preferred the status quo to a change favorable to the others.
- 2. Recent reports indicate that resistance activity in Albania has increased, in part as a result of increased activity by emigre elements. Albanian Government leaders have shown concern over the increase of Yugoslav and other propaganda against the regime. At the middle and lower levels of the party and government, including the security organs, a loss of confidence in the long-term prospects of the regime and an increased sense of personal insecurity appear to have developed.
- 3. The Yugoslavs, in addition to supporting an increased tempo of activity by Albanian emigres based in Yugoslavia, have also been making contacts with Albanian emigre groups in other countries and with anti-Hoxha elements within Albania. Despite official de-

- nials, rumors circulate to the effect that the Yugoslavs are preparing to support a forceful overthrow of the Hoxha regime.
- 4. Even if the Yugoslavs should succeed in uniting the various Albanian emigre factions, we do not believe that the emigres could succeed in overthrowing the Hoxha regime without significant defections in the Albanian Government, army, and security forces. At present those forces, though not entirely trustworthy, are under the control of trusted officials, many of whom were trained in the USSR. We believe that these forces would revolt only if they became convinced that an insurrection (a) would receive sufficient aid from the outside to insure success, (b) would not result in Yugoslav, Greek, or Italian domination, and (c) would lead to an independent Albania actively supported by the Western Powers. At present Yugoslav agents are reportedly attempting to convince potential Albanian defectors that Yugoslav aid would be forthcoming and that the US is supporting the Yugoslav activities. So far, however, the Yugoslavs have met with little success in creating the conditions prerequisite to a Yugoslav-sponsored revolution in Albania.
- 5. The Yugoslavs could overthrow the Hoxha regime if they utilized their own forces or large numbers of Kosovars (an Albanian minority in Yugoslavia) for operations in Albania. Even if only Kosovars were used, the Yugoslavs almost certainly estimate that intervention on such a scale would be identified as Yugoslav-supported. The Yugoslavs

^{*&}quot;The Current Situation in Albania with Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav, and Italian Interests," published 20 November 1951.

may estimate that their importance to the West is such that identifiable Yugoslav intervention in Albania would not result in the loss of Western support. However, the Yugoslav leaders probably estimate that identifiable intervention would adversely affect their present favorable relations with the Western Powers, would complicate Yugoslavia's relations with her non-Communist neighbors, and might provoke Soviet or Satellite retaliation.

6. On the other hand, there are advantages for the Yugoslavs in continuing their political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly intervening or deliberately precipitating a coup attempt. By continuing their present course they can promote the predominance of the Yugoslav-supported group within the Albanian emigre movement. They can undermine order and stability in Albania without serious risk of international complications, while developing contacts with disaffected elements within the Albanian regime. If successful in these efforts, they will have placed themselves in a favorable position to exploit any opportunity for intervention or to exercise preponderant influence in any new regime.

7. The Yugoslavs would almost certainly seize upon any opportunity to establish a pro-Yugoslav regime in Albania if it could be done without incurring serious risk of provoking Western disfavor or Soviet retaliation. We believe, however, that for the present they will continue to exert political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly intervening or deliberately precipitating a coup attempt.

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